Created by Jan Alexandr Kopřiva
OSINT-based report
4IT556 - Open Source Intelligence (in English)
Authors: Jan Alexandr Kopřiva, Matěj Lajtkep, Tomáš Pydych
26-11-2025
The 2022 Ukrainian invasion was not a sudden act of aggression.
The planned culmination of years of information warfare, where Russia — driven by Putin’s KGB-style doctrine — used social media, troll farms, and narrative manipulation to weaken defenses and reshape people’s sense of reality.
OSINT can help us uncover small breadcrumbs of valuable proof information that Putin's regime never wanted us to see.
Exploring such a topic is necessary due to its severe consequences.
Pilipey, R. (2024, únor 24). Image bank of the war in Ukraine. Russia’s War in Ukraine. https://war.ukraine.ua/photos/
RQ2: To what extent did automated or coordinated account networks contribute to the circulation of these narratives on Twitter/X and Telegram?
RQ3: How effective were platform-level interventions on Twitter/X and Telegram in identifying, limiting, or moderating the spread of these narratives?
Narrative Identification (RQ1)
Network/Bot Analysis (RQ2)
Moderation Effectiveness (RQ3)
AI tools (ChatGPT 5.1, Grok 4, Gemini 3, NotebookLM, Cursor, Venice AI) have been used throught all our work to summarize large amounts of data, build scripts, and help with text coherence.
Risa De Putin GIF – Laugh Lol Funny – Objevte a sdílejte GIFy. (b.r.). [Video recording]. Získáno 25. listopad 2025, z https://media1.tenor.com/m/F784zs9y3AUAAAAC/laugh-lol.gif
Which pro-Kremlin narratives dominated Telegram and Twitter/X from February 2022 to February 2023?
Sources: Author's own dataset
To what extent did automated or coordinated account networks contribute to the circulation of these narratives on Twitter/X and Telegram?
Pro-Kremlin narratives spread through coordinated ecosystems, not organic user activity. Telegram relied on large channel constellations (Surf Noise, InfoDefense, Node of Time) that forwarded posts across thousands of channels, while Twitter/X used a mix of state-linked accounts and automated bot clusters exhibiting synchronized posting and shared link patterns.
Sources: Bawa et al. (2025); Kireev et al. (2025); Marigliano et al. (2024)
Sources: Marigliano et al. (2024); Henriksen et al. (2024); Ferrara et al. (2016)
Networks showed clear signs of inauthentic behavior:
Sources: Churanova (2025); Kireev et al. (2025); Vosoughi et al. (2018)
How effective were platform-level interventions on Twitter/X and Telegram in identifying, limiting, or moderating the spread of these narratives?
(*Remember, this was mostly before MUSK!)
Limitations:
Sources: Culliford (2022), McSweeney (2022), Aguerri et al. (2024); Glazunova et al. (2023), Shahi & Mejova (2025)
Sources: Kireev et al. (2025); Churanova (2025), Životić & Obradović (2024), Bawa et al. (2024)
Telegram does not moderate content because of its founder's vision.
Pavel Durov built the platform on a libertarian, anti-censorship philosophy that rejects platform-level control in favor of absolute user freedom.
VnExpress. (b.r.). Billionaire Telegram founder Pavel Durov announces leaving $17B fortune to his over 100 children—VnExpress International. VnExpress International – Latest News, Business, Travel and Analysis from Vietnam. Získáno 25. listopad 2025, z https://e.vnexpress.net/news/tech/personalities/billionaire-telegram-founder-pavel-durov-announces-leaving-17b-fortune-to-his-over-100-children-4904461.html
Russia is known for playing long games. The effects unfold slowly, eroding trust and weakening institutions long before anyone notices; if so, the impact of such a threat cannot be easily measured or countered.
We, democratic societies, remain structurally too open and too slow. We are not yet able to counter coordinated authoritarian influence on a large scale.
1. Stronger platform governance is essential: fast, consistent moderation is the only way to limit viral disinformation before it spreads.
2. Telegram exposed the core threat: unregulated platforms give bad actors a free playground.
3. Building societal education is critical: democracies need better detection, cooperation, and public media literacy to withstand future attacks.
?
Aguerri, J. C., Santisteban, M., & Miró-Llinares, F. (2024). The fight against disinformation and its consequences: Measuring the impact of “Russia state-affiliated media” on Twitter. Crime Science, 13(1), 17. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-024-00215-9
Ahmady, K. (2025, April 8). Consequences of incest: Studying child sexual abuse in Iran.
Alizadeh, M., Gilardi, F., Hoes, E., Klüser, K. J., Kubli, M., & Marchal, N. (2022). Content moderation as a political issue: The Twitter discourse around Trump’s ban. Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media, 2. https://doi.org/10.51685/jqd.2022.023
Alyukov, M., Kunilovskaya, M., & Semenov, A. (2023). Wartime Media Monitor (WarMM-2022): A study of information manipulation on Russian social media during the Russia-Ukraine war. In S. Degaetano-Ortlieb et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th Joint SIGHUM Workshop (pp. 152–161). https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.latechclfl-1.17
Bawa, A., Kursuncu, U., Achilov, D., Shalin, V. L., Agarwal, N., & Akbas, E. (2025). Telegram as a battlefield: Kremlin-related communications during the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Version 3) [Preprint]. arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2501.01884
Biron, B. (2022, March 5). Twitter bans more than 100 accounts using the hashtag #IStandWithPutin for violating the platform’s “manipulation and spam policy”. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-bans-accounts-using-istandwithputputin-for-violating-spam-policy-2022-3
Churanova, O. (2025). Recognition of disinformation in Telegram: Analysis of signs and mechanisms of spread. Образ, 2(48), 75–80. https://doi.org/10.21272/Obraz.2025.2(48)-75-80
Culliford, E. (2022a, February 28). Twitter will label, reduce visibility of tweets linking to Russian state media. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-will-label-reduce-visibility-tweets-linking-russian-state-media-2022-02-28/
Culliford, E. (2022b, March 2). Twitter to comply with EU sanctions on Russian state media. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-comply-with-eu-sanctions-russian-state-media-2022-03-02/
Culliford, E. (2022c, March 11). Twitter, Facebook remove Russian embassy tweet on Mariupol hospital bombing. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/twitter-removes-russian-embassy-tweet-mariupol-hospital-bombing-2022-03-10/
Culliford, E. (2022d, April 5). Twitter won’t recommend Russia govt accounts, will prohibit some POW content. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-wont-recommend-russia-govt-accounts-will-prohibit-some-pow-content-2022-04-05/
Dang, S., & Culliford, E. (2022, May 20). Twitter to tackle Ukraine conflict misinformation with warning labels. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-tackle-ukraine-conflict-misinformation-with-warning-labels-2022-05-19/
DeepL. (2025). DeepL Translate: The world’s most accurate translator. https://www.deepl.com/en/translator
DFRLab. (2022, March 10). #IStandWithPutin hashtag trends amid dubious amplification efforts. https://medium.com/dfrlab/istandwithputin-hashtag-trends-amid-dubious-amplification-efforts-2b8090ac9630
DFRLab. (2023, March 1). Networks of pro-Kremlin Telegram channels spread disinformation at a global scale. https://medium.com/dfrlab/networks-of-pro-kremlin-telegram-channels-spread-disinformation-at-a-global-scale-af4e319bd51e
C. Dhumal (2024). How to Use Twitter Advanced Search: The Ultimate Guide. https://www.guidingtech.com/use-twitter-advanced-search/
Fridman, O., & Boucher, J.-C. (2025). Russia’s worldwide information manipulations on Telegram and X: A pilot study. Community of Democracies. https://community-democracies.org/docs/russias-worldwide-information-manipulations-on-telegram-and-x-a-pilot-study/
Geissler, D., Bär, D., Pröllochs, N., & Feuerriegel, S. (2023). Russian propaganda on social media during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. EPJ Data Science, 12(1), 35. https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00414-5
Glazunova, S., Ryzhova, A., Bruns, A., Montaña-Niño, S. X., Beseler, A., & Dehghan, E. (2023). A platform policy implementation audit of actions against Russia’s state-controlled media. Internet Policy Review, 12(2). https://doi.org/10.14763/2023.2.1711
Google. (2024). NotebookLM [Large language model]. https://notebooklm.google.com/
Gorwa, R., Binns, R., & Katzenbach, C. (2020). Algorithmic content moderation: Technical and political challenges in the automation of platform governance. Big Data & Society, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719897945
Henriksen, F. M., Kristensen, J. B., & Mayerhöffer, E. (2024). Dissemination of RT and Sputnik content in European digital alternative news environments. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 29(3), 795–818. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241230281
Kaplan, A. (2023). A right-wing, Macedonia-linked site appears to have partnered with multiple QAnon figures. Media Matters. https://www.mediamatters.org/qanon-conspiracy-theory/right-wing-macedonia-linked-site-appears-have-partnered-multiple-qanon
Kireev, K., Mykhno, Y., Troncoso, C., & Overdorf, R. (2025). A Telegram dataset of propaganda and its moderation. Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, 19, 2510–2518. https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v19i1.35952
Kling, J., & Poliakoff, S. (2025). Facebook, the EU and Russia’s war: Challenges of moderating authoritarian news. Internet Policy Review, 14(3). https://doi.org/10.14763/2025.3.2036
Kremlin. (2025). Official website of the President of Russia (English version). http://en.kremlin.ru/
Lee, E. (2020). Moderating content moderation: A framework for nonpartisanship in online governance.
McSweeney, S. (2022, March 16). Наш поточний підхід до війни в Україні. Twitter Blog. https://blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2022/our-ongoing-approach-to-the-war-in-ukraine
Milmo, D., & Farah, H. (2022, March 10). Twitter removes Russian embassy tweet on Mariupol bombing. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/10/twitter-removes-russian-embassy-tweet-on-mariupol-bombing
Obradović, D., & Životić, I. (2024). Telegram as a specific playground of the Kremlin’s information operations in Serbia. National Security and the Future, 25(1), 65–92. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.25.1.3
OpenAI. (2025). 5.1 [Large language model]. https://chatgpt.com/?model=gpt-4o
Pierri, F., Luceri, L., Chen, E., & Ferrara, E. (2023). How does Twitter account moderation work? EPJ Data Science, 12(1), 43. https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00420-7
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2022, July 30). Ukraine denounces Russian Embassy tweet calling for “humiliating death” of Azov regiment. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russian-embassy-tweet-azov/31966871.html
Shahi, G. K., & Mejova, Y. (2025). Too little, too late: Moderation of misinformation around the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Proceedings of the 17th ACM Web Science Conference 2025, 379–390. https://doi.org/10.1145/3717867.3717876
Shultz, B. (2023). The Russian government’s use of official Twitter accounts to influence discussions about its war in Ukraine. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Workshop on Multimedia AI against Disinformation (pp. 45–51). https://doi.org/10.1145/3592572.3592843
Suzor, N. (2020). Understanding content moderation systems. In R. Whalen (Ed.), Computational legal studies. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788977456.00013
Telethon (2019). Telethon’s Documentation https://docs.telethon.dev/en/stable/
Telegram (2014). Obtaining api_id https://core.telegram.org/api/obtaining_api_id
Ukraine: OSoMe White Paper. (2022).
Vériter, S. L. (2025). The collective securitization of “disinformation” and the EU’s ban on RT and Sputnik.
VnExpress. (2025). Billionaire Telegram founder Pavel Durov announces leaving $17B fortune to his over 100 children. https://e.vnexpress.net/news/tech/personalities/billionaire-telegram-founder-pavel-durov-announces-leaving-17b-fortune-to-his-over-100-children-4904461.html
Willaert, T., Peeters, S., Seijbel, J., & Van Raemdonck, N. (2022). Disinformation networks: A quali-quantitative investigation of antagonistic Dutch-speaking Telegram channels. First Monday. https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v27i5.12533
X Corp. (2025). Grok 3 [Large language model]. https://grok.com/
Zhang, Y. (2024). The internet frontline: How narratives of the Russia-Ukraine conflict compete on social media (Doctoral dissertation). University of York. https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/36204/
